

# HACK1

## EXCELLIUM

Your first call when it comes to IT and Security!

March 16, 2017

TLP: AMBER



## Security Audit Intrusion Test

Trust implies control,  
Rate your vulnerability !





# Summary

Application Security Overview

Assessment

Definitions

Methodology/Tools

Risk Classification

Exploitation

OWASP Testing Guide




## Overview

- How to be sure an application is secure ?
  - How to test an application ?
- 
- Not Simple
  - An application is designed to be used, modified, published

## Overview

- Example




## Overview

- **An application is managed by several teams**
  - **Architecture/design team**
  - **Developers (frontend + backend)**
  - **Business owners**
  - **Governance, risk and Compliance**
  - **Infrastructure Security Team**
  - **System team (Operating system+Backups)**
  - **Middleware/server team**




## Overview



## Overview

- Not so simple .....
- An application is designed to be used, published, tested and modified.
- An application is a full stack software
- Features and associated threats are evolving
- An application is using other infrastructure components


## Where to add the security






## Overview

Example : Web application feature





## Where to Assess ?




Check can be :


- Intrusion Test
- Code review
- SDLC audit
- Risk analysis
- Design assessment
- Configuration validation



# Assessment Overview



## Where to assess





## How to react

- Know your enemy
  - Learn attacks vectors
  - Learn exploitation steps
- Prepare your defense
  - Include secure SDLC in the contract and in the design
  - Secure coding
- Control your work
  - Add security in your CI
  - Review Code
  - Audit your SDLC



# OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

## Learn



## Contract



## Design



## Build



## Test




## Progress



## Can the infrastructure protect the application ?


- What is an infrastructure now ?
- What is an application ?
- Example :
  - The client said «create a web site named amazin.com to quicker sell products to our clients »
  - Lets build the infrastructure together

## The old way







## More classical



## How to attack Fort Knox ?



## Black, White, Grey Boxes ?





## What is a vulnerability ?

- **Vulnerability is a cyber-security term that refers to a flaw in a system that can leave it open to attack. A vulnerability may also refer to any type of weakness in a computer system itself, in a set of procedures, or in anything that leaves information security exposed to a threat.**





## What is a point of view ?

- **Level of authorization needed to find the threat and exploit it.**
- **Examples : visitor, authenticated user, internal corporate user, administrator**

## What is knowledge ?

- In a vulnerability assessment, the knowledge an attacker has about the target improves the attack surface coverage when searching for vulnerabilities
- Examples : no knowledge, application flows, config files, source code

## Bad practices?

- Intrusion Tester bad practices
  - Capture the flag oriented
  - In depth approach
  - Exploitation oriented



CONGRATULATIONS ON  
CAPTURING THE FLAG!

You've earned yourself a special edition Stripe Capture the Flag t-shirt.  
Please give us your mailing address below:



## Real methodology ?

- Preparation
- Reconnaissance
- Collection
- Exploitation
- Analysis
- Back to the top.....
- Reporting



## Preparation

- Define the scope
- Define an attack strategy
- Study the targeted technology
- Determine the knowledge and points of view
- Written permission !!!



## Reconnaissance

- Public information
- Footprinting
- Version mapping/known vulnerabilities
- Social networks information




## Collection

- Let's attack more
- Manual testing
- Automated scans
- Still the point of view notion
- Threat Enumeration

## Exploitation

- Combine vulnerabilities with exploitability and detectability
- Gives access to new lands
- Maintain access
- List alteration





## Framework



ASVS 2014

*Web Application Standard*

### **Level 0: Cursory**

Level 0 (or Cursory) is an optional certification, indicating that the application has passed some type of verification.





## Framework



ASVS 2014

*Web Application Standard*

### **Level 1: Opportunistic**

An application achieves Level 1 (or Opportunistic) certification if it adequately defends against application security vulnerabilities that are easy to discover.



## Framework



ASVS 2014

*Web Application Standard*

### **Level 2: Standard**

An application achieves Level 2 (or Standard) verification if it also adequately defends against prevalent application security vulnerabilities whose existence poses moderate-to-serious risk.



## Framework

### **Level 3: Advanced**

An application achieves Level 3 (or Advanced) certification if it also adequately defends against all advanced application security vulnerabilities, and also demonstrates principles of good security design.

# Kali linux

- Metasploit
- Nmap
- Nessus
- Zed Attack Proxy
- Sqlmap
- Python
- Beef



# Understanding Metasploit

- To Software Developers, a **bug** is synonymous to a vulnerability.
  - Ex: Errors in program's source code or flawed program design
    - Buffer overflows
    - Memory leaks
    - Dead locks
    - Arithmetic overflow
    - Accessing protected memory (Access Violation)



# Understanding Metasploit

- Regardless though which type of software bug we are speaking of, they are used as the foundation to form an ***exploit***.
  - Therefore, an exploit is a security attack on a vulnerability.
    - In other words (again), an exploit attacking a vulnerability is generating an event that the application/program/OS is not programmed/designed to recover successfully and therefore the result is a system that discontinues to function correctly
- How will this give us access to a secured System?

**Answer: It won't.**

- Each exploit can be designed to meet the methodology of your attack.
  - Ex: An attacker exploits an IDS to reboot it or crash it before he/she launches a further attack to avoid detection.

# Understanding Metasploit

- However, Exploits have more potential!
  - They are commonly used to install system malware or gain system access or recruit client machines into an existing 'botnet'.
- This is accomplished with the help of a *payload*
- The **payload** is a sequence of code that is executed when the vulnerability is triggered
- To make things clear, an Exploit is really broken up into two parts, like so;

EXPLOIT = Vulnerability + Payload;

# Understanding Metasploit

- The payload is usually written in Assembly Language
- Platform and OS dependant.
  - A Win32 payload will not work in Linux (even if we are exploiting the same bug)
    - Big Endian, Small Endian Architectures
- Different payload types exist and they accomplish different tasks
  - `exec` → Execute a command or program on the remote system
  - `download_exec` → Download a file from a URL and execute
  - `upload_exec` → Upload a local file and execute
  - `adduser` → Add user to system accounts

# Understanding Metasploit


- However, the most common payload type used with exploits are **shellcodes or aka shell payloads**.
  - These payloads are very useful because they provide the attacker an interactive shell that can be used to completely control the system remotely
  - The term is inherited from Unix → /bin/sh
  - For Win OS's, shells actually refer to command prompt → cmd.exe
- There are two different types of shell payloads;
  - Bind Shells → A socket is created, a port is bound to it and when an a connection is established to it, it will spawn a shell.
  - Reverse Shells → Instead of creating a listening socket, a connection is created to a predefined IP and Port and a shell is then shoveled to the Attacker.

# Understanding Metasploit

- The MSF is not only an environment for exploit development but also a platform for launching exploits on real-world applications. It is packaged with real exploits that can provide real damage if not used professionally.
- The fact that MSF is an open-source tool and provides such a simplified method for launching dangerous attacks, it has and still is attracting wannabe hackers and script kiddies that do no more than create additional problems on networks and system.




# Understanding Metasploit






# Nessus



# OWASP ZAP



# SQLMAP

```
$ python sqlmap.py -u "http://target/vuln.php?id=1" --batch
```

```
{1.0-dev-4512258}
http://sqlmap.org
```


```
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual
consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable
local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not respon-
sible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
```

```
[*] starting at 15:02:07
```

```
[15:02:07] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[15:02:07] [INFO] heuristics detected web page charset 'ascii'
[15:02:07] [INFO] testing if the target URL is stable. This can take a couple of
seconds
[15:02:08] [INFO] target URL is stable
[15:02:08] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[15:02:08] [INFO] confirming that GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[15:02:08] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[15:02:08] [INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might be
injectable (possible DBMS: 'MySQL')
```




## Taxonomy



## Taxonomy

- CWE (Mitre)
- CVE (Mitre)
- CAPEC (Mitre)
- CVSS (NIST)
- CPE (Mitre)
- WASC
- OWASP TOP 10
- SANS TOP 20
- Exploit-DB



- Information Gathering
- Configuration
- Identity Management
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Session Management
- Input Validation
- Error Handling
- Weak Cryptography
- Business Logic
- Client Side

## Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-001)

- `site:www.owasp.org`
- `cache:owasp.org`
- Maltego
- Shodanhq





## Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-001)

- ShodanHQ query on CNS.LU site


Shodan Scanhub Developers View All...

SHODAN net:80.90.54.2

Explore Membership Contact Us Blog Enterprise Access

Exploits Maps Download Results Create Report

### TOP COUNTRIES



Luxembourg 15

### TOP SERVICES

HTTPS (8443)	2
POP3 + SSL	2
IMAP + SSL	2
SMTP	2
FTP	2

### TOP ORGANIZATIONS

Visual Online S.A.	15
--------------------	----

### TOP OPERATING SYSTEMS

Linux 3.x	1
-----------	---

### TOP PRODUCTS

Postfix smtpd	3
ProFTPD	2
Apache httpd	2

Showing results 1 - 10 of 15

#### 80.90.54.2

plesk01-hn.vo.lu  
Visual Online S.A.  
Added on 2015-09-23 15:49:07 GMT  
Luxembourg  
Details

220 plesk01-hn.vo.lu ESMTF Postfix  
250-plesk01-hn.vo.lu  
250-PIPELINING  
250-SIZE 10240000  
250-ETRN  
250-STARTTLS  
250-AUTH PLAIN CRAM-MD5 LOGIN DIGEST-MD5  
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES  
250-8BITMIME  
250 DSN

#### 80.90.54.2

plesk01-hn.vo.lu  
Visual Online S.A.  
Added on 2015-09-22 21:24:34 GMT  
Luxembourg  
Details

220 ProFTPD 1.3.5a Server (ProFTPD) [80.90.54.2]  
530 Login incorrect.  
214-The following commands are recognized (\* =>'s unimplemented):  
CWD XCWD CDUP XCUP SMNT\* QUIT PORT PASV  
EPRT EPSV ALL0\* RNFR RNT0 DELE MDTM RMD  
XRMD MKD XMKD PW...

#### Parallels Plesk Panel 11.5.30

80.90.54.2  
plesk01-hn.vo.lu  
Visual Online S.A.  
Added on 2015-09-21 21:46:22 GMT  
Luxembourg  
Details

##### SSL Certificate

Issued By:  
Common Name: RapidSSL SHA256  
CA - G3  
Organization: GeoTrust Inc.  
Issued To:  
Common Name: hnweb.healthnet.lu

##### Supported SSL Versions

SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2

##### Diffie-Hellman Parameters

Fingerprint: nginx/Hardcoded

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: sw-cp-server  
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2015 21:46:17 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Connection: keep-alive  
Expires: Fri, 28 May 1999 00:00:00 GMT  
Last-Modified: Mon, 21 Sep 2015 21:46:17 GMT  
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate  
Cache-...

```
C:\Windows\system32>ping cns.lu  
Pinging cns.lu [80.90.54.2] with 32 bytes of data:  
^C  
C:\Windows\system32>
```



## Fingerprint Web Server (OTG-INFO-002)

```
$ telnet sunone.example.com 80
```

```
GET / HTTP/3.0
```

```
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request
```

```
Server: Sun-ONE-Web-Server/6.1
```

```
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 15:25:00 GMT
```

```
Content-length: 0
```


```
Content-type: text/html
```

```
Connection: close
```

## Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-003)

Robots.txt

Meta Tag




## Enumerate Applications on Webserver (OTG-INFO-004)

- Enumerate Applications on Webserver (OTG-INFO-004)

- Non-standard ports
- Virtual hosts
- Different base URL
- Reverse-IP services

- NMAP
- Manual hacking
- DNS




```
Nmap Output | Ports / Hosts | Topology | Host Details | Scans
nmap -T4 -A -v scanme.nmap.org
host)
Initiating OS detection (try #1) against scanme.nmap.org (64.13.134.52)
Initiating Traceroute at 12:05
Completed Traceroute at 12:05, 0.29s elapsed
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 12 hosts. at 12:05
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 12 hosts. at 12:05, 6.64s elapsed
NSE: Script scanning 64.13.134.52.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 1) scan.
Initiating NSE at 12:05
Completed NSE at 12:05, 4.17s elapsed
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org (64.13.134.52)
Host is up (0.074s latency).
Not shown: 993 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 1024
60:ac:4d:51:b1:cd:85:09:12:16:92:76:1d:5d:27:6e (DSA)
|_ 2048 2c:22:75:60:4b:c3:3b:18:a2:97:2c:96:7e:28:dc:dd (RSA)
25/tcp    closed smtp
```

## Review webpage comments and metadata for information leakage (OTG-INFO-005)

- Comments in META tags
- Javascript libraries versions

```
/*! * jQuery JavaScript Library v1.4.4 * http://jquery.com/ * *  
Copyright 2010, John Resig * Dual licensed under the MIT or  
GPL Version 2 licenses. * http://jquery.org/license * * Includes  
Sizzle.js * http://sizzlejs.com/ * Copyright 2010, The Dojo  
Foundation * Released under the MIT, BSD, and GPL Licenses. *  
* Date
```




```
1 <!--  
2  
3 wp_head(); wp_head(); -->  
4  
5 <!DOCTYPE html>  
6 <html dir="ltr" lang="en-US">  
7 <head>
```

## Identify application entry points (OTG-INFO-006)

- Identify application entry points (OTG-INFO-006)
- All POST, Cookie, GET, SESSION variables.

- Tamper Data for Firefox
- FireBug
- ZAP
- BURP



## Map execution paths through application (OTG-INFO-007)

- Map the target application and understand the principal workflows.
  - Diagramming software
  - Spider
- 
- <http://target.org/phpmyadmin>
  - <http://target.org/application1>
  - <http://target.org/manager>





# Testing Guide

## Map execution p

- Map the target ap
- Diagramming soft
- Spider
- <http://target.org>
- <http://target.org>
- <http://target.org>

burp suite free edition v1.4.01

burp intruder repeater window about

target proxy spider scanner intruder repeater sequencer decoder comparer options alerts

site map scope

Filter: hiding not found items; hiding CSS, image and general binary content; hiding 4xx responses; hiding empty folders

host	method	URL	params	status	length	MIME type
http://[redacted]	GET	/		200	26872	HTML
http://[redacted]	GET	/images/		200	2976	HTML
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/		200	2976	HTML
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/ajaxtabs/		200	203	
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/ajaxtabs/ajaxtabs.js		200	11722	script
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/css/		200	762	HTML
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/js/		200	1030	HTML
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/js/a.js		200	6092	script
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/js/a_002.js		200	23368	script
http://[redacted]	GET	/include/js/a_003.js		200	2486	script

response request

raw headers hex html render

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 07:47:56 GMT  
Server: Apache  
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17  
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT  
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0  
Pragma: no-cache  
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=d20264d5b1a425af4d22cb49741c24e0; path=/  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 26506

<html>  
<head>  
<title>  
Solution & Service  
- </title>

0 matches

## Fingerprint Web Application Framework (OTG-INFO-008)

- Javascript Libraries
- Security Components in place
- HTTP headers
- Cookies
- HTML source code
- Specific files and folders
- Wappalyzer



## Fingerprint Web Application (OTG-INFO-009)

- HTML source code
- Cookies
- Wordpress scanner, Joomla Scanner

## Fingerprint W

- HTML source code
- Cookies
- Wordpress scanner

```
WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team
Version 2.4.1
Sponsored by the RandomStorm Open Source Initiative
@_WPScan_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan_lr, pvd1, @_FireFart_

[+] URL: http://funfetti.in/
[+] Started: Tue Nov 11 09:48:22 2014

[+] robots.txt available under: 'http://funfetti.in/robots.txt'
[+] Interesting header: SERVER: nginx/1.6.2
[+] Interesting header: SET-COOKIE: wfvrt_268428572=5461cd61ca262; expires=Tue, 11-Nov-2014 09:18:33 GMT; path=/; httponly
[+] Interesting header: SET-COOKIE: wordpress_6505b7b25bbd635718b0ec934401b12a=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/wp-content/plugins; httponly
[+] Interesting header: SET-COOKIE: wordpress_6505b7b25bbd635718b0ec934401b12a=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/wp-admin; httponly
[+] Interesting header: SET-COOKIE: wordpress_logged_in_6505b7b25bbd635718b0ec934401b12a=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/; httponly
[+] XML-RPC Interface available under: http://funfetti.in/xmlrpc.php

[+] WordPress version 4.0 identified from advanced fingerprinting

[+] WordPress theme in use: Karma - v1.2

[+] Name: Karma - v1.2
| Location: http://funfetti.in/wp-content/themes/Karma/
| Style URL: http://funfetti.in/wp-content/themes/Karma/style.css
| Theme Name: Karma
| Description:
| Author: Fabthemes.com
| Author URI: www.fabthemes.com

[+] Enumerating plugins from passive detection ...

[+] No plugins found


[+] Finished: Tue Nov 11 09:48:48 2014
[+] Memory used: 1.172 MB
[+] Elapsed time: 00:00:26
```

09)

# Map Application Architecture (OTG-INFO-010)

- Map Application Architecture (OTG-INFO-010)
- How many servers ?
- Security components in place, blocking mode ?

## Map Application Architecture (OTG-INFO-010)






## Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-001)

- Security Components in place
- Administrative tools (JMX console, SSH, FTP)

## Test Application Platform Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-002)

- Default directories (\_vti\_bin, /icons)
- Defaults rights
- Expected .htaccess to work.
- Logging (storage, rotation, private information)




```
32 <!--
33 <role rolename="tomcat"/>
34 <role rolename="role1"/>
35 <user username="tomcat" password="tomcat" roles="tomcat"/>
36 <user username="both" password="tomcat" roles="tomcat,role1"/>
37 <user username="role1" password="tomcat" roles="role1"/>
38 -->
39 <user username="ide" password="yeye" roles="manager-script,admin"/>
40 </tomcat-users>
41
```

## Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-003)

- .git/
- Index2.php
- Index.php.old
- Index.php~
- Source code comments, javascript libraries
- Open source projects...
- /includes or /inc


THC-HYDRA  
BRUTUS



## Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces (OTG-CONFIG-005)

- phpMyAdmin
- Trac
- /admin or /administrator
- /manager
- JMX console

THC-HYDRA  
BRUTUS



## Test HTTP Methods (OTG-CONFIG-006)

OPTIONS

GET

HEAD

POST

TRACE

CONNECT

PUT

DELETE

PROPFIND

LOCK

UNLOCK

COPY


MOVE

MKCOL

PROPPATCH

PUT

DELETE





## Test HTTP Strict Transport Security (OTG-CONFIG-007)

GET HRS\_HRAM.HRS\_APP\_SCHJOB.GBL 200 OK 24,9 KB 2:443 445ms

Entêtes Réponse HTML Cookies

Réponse voir le code source

Content-Type text/html; CHARSET=UTF-8  
Date Tue, 14 Oct 2014 08:18:49 GMT  
Expires Thu, 01 Dec 1994 16:00:00 GMT  
Location  
Set-Cookie PS\_LOGINLIST=https://uat-e /hr; secure; domain=uat-e ; https://uat-  
\_hr; secure; path=/  
PS\_TOKENEXPIRE=14\_Oct\_2014\_08:18:49\_GMT; secure; domain=uat-e ; path=/  
TS01ab06ad=01d814b5ea1ef0bb242761b553a356f5877c6551b7e55c645bc2af2261481d4e53815bdef9c1c942bae3ed847a9d49d0bc7757c  
; Path=/  
TS01763a0f=01d814b5ea70cfd6e09f3bb98e4d665ff0a1b424c031a03ecadb3b50521b118c20dac8b56dfa27669fc6cecb3  
c3a9b61273b50e033ebfa436bce93e4de52ea03867fb2fd1eb351e9dd6321ef164b3cfa1db4bb4bda67662e48d960316639299e3b5b2daf3f  
; path=/; domain=uat-e  
Transfer-Encoding chunked  
X-Powered-By Servlet/2.5 JSP/2.1  
ignoreportalregisteredurl 1  
portalregisteredurl https://u 'psc/hr/EMPLOYEE/HRMS/s/WEBLIB\_BEI.ISCRIPT1.FieldFormula.IScript\_ERE  
C\_APPLICANT  
usesportalrelativeurl true



## Test RIA cross domain policy (OTG-CONFIG-008)

Crossdomain.xml


Clientaccesspolicy.xml

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM "http://www.adobe.com/xml/dtds/cross-
domain-policy.dtd">
<cross-domain-policy>
<allow-access-from domain="*" />
</cross-domain-policy>
```

same origin policy bypass

Cross origin resource sharing (CORS), JSONP -> later

- **Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-001)**
- **Test Application Platform Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-002)**
- **Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-003)**
- **Review Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-004)**
- **Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces (OTG-CONFIG-005)**
- **Test HTTP Methods (OTG-CONFIG-006)**
- **Test HTTP Strict Transport Security (OTG-CONFIG-007)**
- **Test RIA cross domain policy (OTG-CONFIG-008)**





# Testing Guide

- Identity Testing



## Security Audit Intrusion Test

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## Test Role Definitions (OTG-IDENT-001)

- Role definition
- Role based access control
- Role mapping and assignment

## Test User Registration Process (OTG-IDENT-002)

- [1] Can anyone register for access?
- [2] Are registrations vetted by a human prior to provisioning, or are they automatically granted if the criteria are met?
- [3] Can the same person or identity register multiple times?
- [4] Can users register for different roles or permissions?
- [5] What proof of identity is required for a registration to be successful?
- [6] Are registered identities verified?

Validate the registration process:

- [1] Can identity information be easily forged or faked?
- [2] Can the exchange of identity information be manipulated during registration?



# Test Account Provisioning Process (OTG-IDENT-003)


- Is there any verification, vetting and authorization of provisioning requests?
- Is there any verification, vetting and authorization of de-provisioning requests?
- Can an administrator provision other administrators or just users?
- Can an administrator or other user provision accounts with privileges greater than their own?
- Can an administrator or user de-provision themselves?
- How are the files or resources owned by the de-provisioned user managed? Are they deleted? Is access transferred?

## Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account (OTG-IDENT-004)

- Client request: Valid user/wrong password --> Server answer: 'The password is not correct'
- Client request: Wrong user/wrong password --> Server answer: 'User not recognized'
- Analyzing the error code received on login pages
- Analyzing URLs and URLs re-directions
- Analyzing Web page Titles
- Analyzing a message received from a recovery facility

## Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy (OTG-IDENT-005)

- Determine the structure of account names.
- Evaluate the application's response to valid and invalid account names.
- Use different responses to valid and invalid account names to enumerate valid account names.
- Use account name dictionaries to enumerate valid account names.





# Testing Guide

- Authentication Testing

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## Security Audit Intrusion Test

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## Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel (OTG-AUTHN-001)

- From the server to the client
- From the server to the DB
- From the frontend to the backend

Example 1: Sending data with POST method through HTTP

Example 2: Sending data with POST method through HTTPS

Example 3: Sending data with POST method via HTTPS on a page reachable via HTTP

Example 4: Sending data with GET method through HTTPS



## Testing for default credentials (OTG-AUTHN-002)

How many default credentials in my components ?

How many components in my application 😊 ?

admin:admin

test:test

tomcat:manager

## Testing for Weak lock out mechanism (OTG-AUTHN-003)

- [1] Attempt to log in with an incorrect password 3 times.
- [2] Successfully log in with the correct password, thereby showing that the lockout mechanism doesn't trigger after 3 incorrect authentication attempts.
- [5] Attempt to log in with an incorrect password 5 times.
- [6] Attempt to log in with the correct password. The application returns "Your account is locked out.", thereby confirming that the account is locked out after 5 incorrect authentication attempts.
- [8] Attempt to log in with the correct password 10 minutes later. The application returns "Your account is locked out.", thereby showing that the lockout mechanism does not automatically unlock after 10 minutes.
- [9] Successfully log in with the correct password 15 minutes later, thereby showing that the lockout mechanism automatically unlocks after a 10 to 15 minute period.

Wait..... What about bruteforce ?

## Testing for bypassing authentication schema (OTG-AUTHN-004)

- Direct page request (forced browsing)
- Parameter modification
- Session ID prediction
- SQL injection

## Test remember password functionality (OTG-AUTHN-005)

- Look for passwords being stored in a cookie. Examine the cookies stored by the application. Verify that the credentials are not stored in clear text, but are hashed.
- Examine the hashing mechanism: if it is a common, well-known algorithm, check for its strength; in homegrown hash functions, attempt several usernames to check whether the hash function is easily guessable.
- Verify that the credentials are only sent during the log in phase, and not sent together with every request to the application.
- Consider other sensitive form fields (e.g. an answer to a secret question that must be entered in a password recovery or account unlock form).

## Testing for Browser cache weakness (OTG-AUTHN-006)

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
- Expires: 0
- Pragma: no-cache

## Testing for Weak password policy (OTG-AUTHN-007)

- [1] What characters are permitted and forbidden for use within a password? Is the user required to use characters from different character sets such as lower and uppercase letters, digits and special symbols?
- [2] How often can a user change their password? How quickly can a user change their password after a previous change? Users may bypass password history requirements by changing their password 5 times in a row so that after the last password change they have configured their initial password again.
- [3] When must a user change their password? After 90 days? After account lockout due to excessive log on attempts?
- [4] How often can a user reuse a password? Does the application maintain a history of the user's previous used 8 passwords?
- [5] How different must the next password be from the last password?
- [6] Is the user prevented from using his username or other account information (such as first or last name) in the password?



## Testing for Weak security question/answer (OTG-AUTHN-008)

Pre-generated questions:

The answers may be known to family members or close friends of the user, e.g. “What is your mother’s maiden name?”, “What is your date of birth?”

Self-generated questions:

What is  $1+1$ ?


## Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities (OTG-AUTHN-009)

- [1] if users, other than administrators, can change or reset passwords for accounts other than their own.
- [2] if users can manipulate or subvert the password change or reset process to change or reset the password of another user or administrator.
- [3] if the password change or reset process is vulnerable to CSRF.
- [4] Is the old password requested to complete the change?

## Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel (OTG-AUTHN-010)

- Standard website
- Mobile, or specific device, optimized website
- Accessibility optimized website
- Alternative country and language websites
- Parallel websites that utilize the same user accounts (e.g. another website offering different functionality of the same organization, a partner website with which user accounts are shared)
- Development, test, UAT and staging versions of the standard website

- Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel (OTG-AUTHN-001)
- Testing for default credentials (OTG-AUTHN-002)
- Testing for Weak lock out mechanism (OTG-AUTHN-003)
- Testing for bypassing authentication schema (OTG-AUTHN-004)
- Test remember password functionality (OTG-AUTHN-005)
- Testing for Browser cache weakness (OTG-AUTHN-006)
- Testing for Weak password policy (OTG-AUTHN-007)
- Testing for Weak security question/answer (OTG-AUTHN-008)
- Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities (OTG-AUTHN-009)
- Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel (OTG-AUTHN-010)





# Testing Guide

- Authorization Testing



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Testing Directory traversal/file include (OTG-AUTHZ-001)

<http://example.com/getUserProfile.jsp?item=../../../../etc/passwd>

<http://example.com/index.php?file=http://www.owasp.org/malicioustxt>

[\\server\\_or\\_ip\path\to\file.abc](#) -> Microsoft single sign on and cross server request forgery

## Testing for bypassing authorization schema (OTG-AUTHZ-002)

- Is it possible to access that resource even if the user is not authenticated?
- Is it possible to access that resource after the log-out?
- Is it possible to access functions and resources that should be accessible to a user that holds a different role or privilege?
- Is it possible to access administrative functions also if the tester is logged as a user with standard privileges?
- Is it possible to use these administrative functions as a user with A different role and for whom that action should be denied?

## Testing for Privilege Escalation (OTG-AUTHZ-003)

Testing for role/privilege manipulation

Where are the controls : On the view, model, controller ? Switch user ?


## Testing for Insecure Direct Object References (OTG-AUTHZ-004)

Uploaded files, banking details

`http://foo.bar/showImage?img=img00011`

- Testing Directory traversal/file include (OTG-AUTHZ-001)
- Testing for bypassing authorization schema (OTG-AUTHZ-002)
- Testing for Privilege Escalation (OTG-AUTHZ-003)
- Testing for Insecure Direct Object References (OTG-AUTHZ-004)

# Testing Guide





# Testing Guide

- Session Management



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## Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema (OTG-SESS-001)

Are all Set-Cookie directives tagged as Secure?

- Do any Cookie operations take place over unencrypted transport?
- Can the Cookie be forced over unencrypted transport?
- If so, how does the application maintain security?
- Are any Cookies persistent?
- What Expires= times are used on persistent cookies, and are they reasonable?
- Are cookies that are expected to be transient configured as such?
- What HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control settings are used to protect Cookies?
- What HTTP/1.0 Cache-Control settings are used to protect Cookies?

sha256(192.168.100.1:owaspuser:password:15:58)

Birthday paradox

## Testing for Cookies attributes (OTG-SESS-002)

- secure
- httponly
- domain
- path
- expire



## Testing for Session Fixation (OTG-SESS-003)

POST https://www.example.com/authentication.php HTTP/1.1

Host: www.example.com

.....

Keep-Alive: 300

Connection: keep-alive

Referer: http://www.example.com

Cookie: JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-length: 57

Name=Meucci&wpPassword=secret!&wpLoginattempt=Log+in

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 14:52:58 GMT

Server: Apache/2.2.2 (Fedora)

X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6

Content-language: en

Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate, max-age=0

Content-length: 4090

Connection: close

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


## Testing for Exposed Session ID (OTG-SESS-004)

- Protocol used (e.g., HTTP vs. HTTPS)
- HTTP Headers
- Mixed content
- Message Body (e.g., POST or page content)



## Cross Site Request Forgery Attacks

Attacking trust relationships



Protection actions –

- Tag each form with unique token and verify on form submission.
- Verify Referer headers, if available.



## Testing for logout functionality (OTG-SESS-006)

- A log out button is present on all pages of the web application.
- The log out button should be identified quickly by a user who wants to log out from the web application.
- After loading a page the log out button should be visible without scrolling.
- Ideally the log out button is placed in an area of the page that is fixed in the view port of the browser and not affected by scrolling of the content

What in an SSO environnement ?

## Test Session Timeout (OTG-SESS-007)

- The log out function effectively destroys all session token, or at least renders them unusable,
- The server performs proper checks on the session state, disallowing an attacker to replay previously destroyed session identifiers
- A timeout is enforced and it is properly enforced by the server. If the server uses an expiration time that is read from a session token that is sent by the client (but this is not advisable), then the token must be cryptographically protected from tampering.

## Testing for Session puzzling (OTG-SESS-008)

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses the same session variable for more than one purpose.

Classical example : shared host + 2 applications.  
\$\_SESSION["logged"]=true; in one application.

Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema (OTG-SESS-001)

Testing for Cookies attributes (OTG-SESS-002)

Testing for Session Fixation (OTG-SESS-003)

Testing for Exposed Session Variables (OTG-SESS-004)

Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (OTG-SESS-005)

Testing for logout functionality (OTG-SESS-006)

Test Session Timeout (OTG-SESS-007)

Testing for Session puzzling (OTG-SESS-008)



# Testing Guide

- Input Validation

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
## Security Audit Intrusion Test

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# Testing Guide

## BEEF 0.4.2.9-ALPHA XSSRAYS INTEGRATION





Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting (OTG-INPVAL-001)  
Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting (OTG-INPVAL-002)  
Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering (OTG-INPVAL-003)  
Testing for HTTP Parameter pollution (OTG-INPVAL-004)  
Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)  
Testing for LDAP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-006)  
Testing for ORM Injection (OTG-INPVAL-007)  
Testing for XML Injection (OTG-INPVAL-008)  
Testing for SSI Injection (OTG-INPVAL-009)  
Testing for XPath Injection (OTG-INPVAL-010)  
IMAP/SMTP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-011)  
Testing for Code Injection (OTG-INPVAL-012)  
Testing for Command Injection (OTG-INPVAL-013)  
Testing for Buffer overflow (OTG-INPVAL-014)  
Testing for incubated vulnerabilities (OTG-INPVAL-015)  
Testing for HTTP Splitting/Smuggling (OTG-INPVAL-016)



```
SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=$id
```

```
$id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1 FROM Credit-CardTable
```

```
SELECT field1, field2, field3 FROM Users WHERE Id='1' AND  
ASCII(SUBSTRING(username,1,1))=97 AND '1'='1'
```

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 AND IF(version()  
like '5%', sleep(10), 'false'))—
```

```
sqlmap
```


SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=\$id


\$id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1 FROM Credit-CardTable

SELECT field1, field2, field3  
ASCII(SUBSTRING(user

http://www.example.com/  
like '5%', sleep(10), 'false

sqlmap







## Analysis of Error Codes (OTG-ERR-001)

## Analysis of Stack Traces (OTG-ERR-002)

### Etat HTTP 500 - Request method 'PUT' not supported

**type** Rapport d'exception

**message** Request method 'PUT' not supported

**description** Le serveur a rencontré une erreur interne qui l'a empêché de satisfaire la requête.

#### exception

```
org.springframework.web.HttpRequestMethodNotSupportedException: Request method 'PUT' not supported
    org.springframework.web.servlet.support.WebContentGenerator.checkAndPrepare (WebContentGenerator.java:250)
    org.springframework.web.servlet.support.WebContentGenerator.checkAndPrepare (WebContentGenerator.java:229)
    org.springframework.webflow.mvc.servlet.FlowHandlerAdapter.handle (FlowHandlerAdapter.java:178)
    org.springframework.web.servlet.DispatcherServlet.doDispatch (DispatcherServlet.java:790)
    org.springframework.web.servlet.DispatcherServlet.doService (DispatcherServlet.java:719)
    org.springframework.web.servlet.FrameworkServlet.processRequest (FrameworkServlet.java:644)
    org.springframework.web.servlet.FrameworkServlet.doPut (FrameworkServlet.java:571)
    javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service (HttpServlet.java:650)
    javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service (HttpServlet.java:728)
    org.jasig.cas.web.init.SafeDispatcherServlet.service_aroundBody2 (SafeDispatcherServlet.java:128)
    org.jasig.cas.web.init.SafeDispatcherServlet.service_aroundBody3$advice (SafeDispatcherServlet.java:57)
    org.jasig.cas.web.init.SafeDispatcherServlet.service (SafeDispatcherServlet.java:1)
    org.springframework.web.filter.CharacterEncodingFilter.doFilterInternal (CharacterEncodingFilter.java:88)
    org.springframework.web.filter.OncePerRequestFilter.doFilter (OncePerRequestFilter.java:76)
    org.springframework.web.filter.DelegatingFilterProxy.invokeDelegate (DelegatingFilterProxy.java:237)
    org.springframework.web.filter.DelegatingFilterProxy.doFilter (DelegatingFilterProxy.java:167)
    com.github.inspektr.common.web.ClientInfoThreadLocalFilter.doFilter (ClientInfoThreadLocalFilter.java:63)
```

**note** La trace complète de la cause mère de cette erreur est disponible dans les fichiers journaux de Apache Tomcat/7.0.33.

Apache Tomcat/7.0.33

## Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection (OTG-CRYPST-001)

Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA  
Failed TLSv1 128 bits AES128-GCM-SHA256  
Failed TLSv1 128 bits AES128-SHA256  
Accepted TLSv1 128 bits AES128-SHA  
Accepted TLSv1 128 bits SEED-SHA  
Accepted TLSv1 128 bits CAMELLIA128-SHA  
Failed TLSv1 128 bits PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits AECDH-RC4-SHA  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ADH-RC4-MD5  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA  
Rejected TLSv1 128 bits ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA  
Accepted TLSv1 128 bits RC4-SHA  
Accepted TLSv1 128 bits RC4-MD5

Kali TLSScan, sslyze



Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

(OTG-CRYPST-001)

Testing for Padding Oracle (OTG-CRYPST-002)


Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels  
(OTG-CRYPST-003)

SSLv3/TLSv1.2 ? Which one ?

Paddbuster


302 redirect for http to https redirection ?

## Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection (OTG-CRYPST-001)



Testing for Padding Oracle (OTG-CRYPST-002)

Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels (OTG-CRYPST-003)





# Testing Guide

- Business Testing

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## Security Audit Intrusion Test

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- Test Business Logic Data Validation (OTG-BUSLOGIC-001)
- Test Ability to Forge Requests (OTG-BUSLOGIC-002)
- Test Integrity Checks (OTG-BUSLOGIC-003)
- Test for Process Timing (OTG-BUSLOGIC-004)
- Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits (OTG-BUSLOGIC-005)
- Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows (OTG-BUSLOGIC-006)
- Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use (OTG-BUSLOGIC-007)
- Test Upload of Unexpected File Types (OTG-BUSLOGIC-008)
- Test Upload of Malicious Files (OTG-BUSLOGIC-009)

- Exploit-DB:
  -
- Victims:
  - <https://github.com/victims/victims-enforcer>
- OWASP Guides:
  - <http://www.lulu.com/spotlight/owasp>
- Password cracking:
  - <http://oclhashcat.org>
  - <http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/password-cracking-evolution/>





# Questions ?

